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Patent Deception in Standard Setting: the Case for Antitrust 
Policy 
 
Herbert Hovenkamp1 
 
Introduction: Patent Continuations and Divisionals 
 
 Many patent applications are rejected upon initial submission, 
but they are almost never rejected with absolute finality.  Further, 
subsequent to filing its original application a patent applicant might 
wish to write an application with broader or somewhat different 
claims, or perhaps add claims that were not made in the original 
application.  Or it may wish to rewrite claims that had been rejected 
in the original application.  A patent "continuation" is an application 
for additional claims made on a patent that was previously applied 
for. 
 
 A "divisional" application is a particular type of patent 
continuation in which the original patent application lacked "unity."  
"Unity of invention" is said to be a prerequisite for patenting because 
a patent may relate to only one invention, or perhaps to a group of 
closely related inventions.  When a patent is rejected for lack of unity 
the patentee may then file a "divisional" application for spin-off of 
second, third, or subsequent inventions.2  The PTO may reject a 
patent altogether for lack of unity, or it may grant a patent on one 
invention while leaving the patentee free to file later divisional 
                                               
     1Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
     2The Patent Act provides for continuations in 35 U.S.C. '132.  On possible 
abuses, see Mark A. Lemley and Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent 
Continuations, 84 Boston Univ. L.Rev. 63 (2004); Christina Bohann and Herbert 
Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, ___ B.C.L.Rev. ___ (2010) 
(in press), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=106256 
 
 In such cases the original application is called the "parent."  Typically the 
patentee will claim one invention off the parent application, and then begin a 
process of filing additional "divisional" applications for other inventions covered by 
the patent.  When these later divisional applications are granted the priority date of 
those patents ordinarily relates back to the date of the parent.  Further, the claims 
language in the subsequent divisional applications need not be identical with that 
in the parent and can cover technology that was not actually contemplated in the 
parent. 
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applications for other inventions that were arguably covered in the 
original application. 
 
 Under generally accepted patent practices in the United 
States, when a subsequent continuation or divisional application is 
granted the subsequent patent "relates back" to the date of the 
original patent application, and will typically retain the original 
application's priority over rival filings. 
 
 While patent continuations are an accepted part of the arcane 
process under which patents are granted, they can also bring 
considerable anticompetitive abuse.3  In particular, the continuation 
process makes it possible for a patentee to write updated claims 
designed to exclude a rival's invention that has been placed on the 
market subsequent to the date of the original application.  For 
example, a patent applicant might file an overly broad patent 
application in 2000.  In 2001 someone else might place a new 
invention on the market.  The 2000 applicant might then file a 
continuation or divisional application expressly designed to cover the 
2001 invention and claim priority over it, even though the 2001 
                                               
     3In 2007 the PTO promulgated amendments to its procedures that were 
intended to limit the number of continuation and divisional applications relating to a 
particular parent patent.  However, a federal district court struck these 
amendments down as exceeding the PTO's rule making authority.  Tafas v. Dudas, 
511 F.Supp.2d 652 (E.D.Va. 2007).  As the court described the proposed rules: 
 
 Under the old system, an applicant could file an unlimited number of 
continuing applications, RCEs [request for continued examination], and 
claims. The Final Rules modify that system in the several ways. First, Final 
Rules 78 and 114 allow an applicant to file two continuation or 
continuation-in-part applications, plus a single RCE, after an initial 
application as a matter of right. If the applicant wants to engage in further 
prosecution, a third continuation or continuation-in-part application or a 
second RCE can be filed with a "petition and showing" that explains why 
the amendment, argument, or evidence could not have been presented in 
one of the previously-filed applications. 
 
Id. at 657-658.  See also Tafas v. Dudas, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2008 WL 
859467 (E.D.Va. Apr. 1, 2008) (rules promulgated by PTO were substantive in 
character and exceeded PTO's rule making authority; granting motion for summary 
judgment). 
 
 Note that a provision included in the House version of the 2007 Patent 
Reform Act at the time of this writing would overrule Tafas by explicitly giving the 
PTO rule making authority. 
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inventor had no reasonable way of knowing that its invention was 
subject to an "earlier" patent.  If a divisional patent is later granted in, 
say, 2002, its priority date will relate back to the 2000 patent.4  The 
harmfulness of this process is exacerbated by the fact that the 
publication requirements for pending patent applications in the 
United States are very weak, requiring publication only 18 months 
after filing, and even then only if the application is not subject to 
foreign filing as well.5  Even if the application is published a rival 
cannot know with certainty what its claims will be until final approval. 
 
 The possibility of such abuses reveals one of the more 
deficient aspects of the patent system's failure to provide adequate 
notice to inventors, as discussed previously.6  While patents may be 
                                               
     4Lemley and Moore cite these cases as examples, with these 
parentheticals: 
 
 [In] Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (E.D. Cal. 
2002), the plaintiff filed a patent application covering monoclonal 
antibodies in 1984, a time when the technology was in its infancy. It kept 
various applications pending in the PTO until 1999, when it drafted new 
claims designed to cover not just monoclonal antibodies as they were 
understood in 1984, but new types of antibodies developed in the 
intervening 15 years, including those invented by the defendant. Id. at 
1151-52. Another example is Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 
F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The patentee there amended his claims to a 
reclining chair to claim placing the controls for that chair in a position he 
never thought of, but saw for the first time on his competitor's product. Id. 
at 1479 ("Sproule admitted at trial that he did not consider placing the 
controls outside the console until he became aware that some of Gentry's 
competitors were so locating the recliner controls."). 
 
See Lemley and Moore, Ending Abuse, note 2, 84 Boston Univ.L.Rev. at 76-
77. 
     5See 35 U.S.C. '122(b). 
     6See 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkmap, Antitrust Law ¶704a,b (3d 
ed. 2008).  See James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How 
Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 62-65 (2008), noting, 
inter alia, that the number of continuing applications had increased seven-fold in 
the previous twenty years.  Further, 
 
 Applicants can change claim language in patents without updating the 
published applications.  The final claim language is published only after 
the patent is issued, and the gap between application date and issuance is 
growing.  Moreover, publication does little to prevent patent applicants 
from introducing unanticipated new claims via continuing applications. 
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a species of property, they are property with a woefully inadequate 
system for recording titles and making them public prior to someone 
else's investment decision.  To the extent a patentee can manipulate 
the continuation or divisional process to write patent claims on the 
existing inventions of other inventors who did not have adequate 
prior notice of them, the policy reduces rather than increases the 
incentive to innovate.  An inventor might do a thorough patent search 
and not find any prior claim on his invention, but later be made the 
subject of an infringement suit on the basis of a continuing or 
divisional application that was filed later but that earns the priority of 
the original patent application. 
 
 Nevertheless, there is probably little room for application of 
the antitrust laws, given that the Federal Circuit has expressly 
approved the use of continuation and divisional applications to write 
updated claims on a competitor's existing products or technology.  
The notice and publication provisions are part of the law as well.7  
While we believe such an approach to the giving of notice deters 
rather than promotes innovation, the fact is that conduct approved by 
                                                                                                                       
 
Id. at 63. 
     7See Kingsdown Medical Consultants v. Hollister, 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988): 
 
 [T]here is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent 
application for the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known 
competitor's product from the market; nor is it in any manner improper to 
amend or insert claims intended to cover a competitor's product the 
applicant's attorney has learned about during the prosecution of a patent 
application. Any such amendment or insertion must comply with all 
statutes and regulations, of course, but, if it does, its genesis in the 
marketplace is simply irrelevant and cannot of itself evidence deceitful 
intent.  To be sure, applicants do not simply have carte blanche to rewrite 
their claims. The new claims must find adequate support in the original 
application. If not, the patent will be invalid for lack of enablement or 
written description, or alternatively, the new claims will be considered "new 
matter" invented only as of the date the claims were added.  If the 
patentee can find some support in the original patent application for the 
current claims, however, she can obtain legal rights over ideas that (at 
least in that form) never occurred to her until she saw what others were 
already doing. 
 
Accord State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 
1985).  See Lemley article, note 1, 84 Boston Univ. L.Rev. at 77-78. 
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law cannot form the basis of an antitrust claim when the patentee 
later files an infringement action based on such an after-acquired 
right. 
 
Misrepresentation and Subsequent Assertion 
of Continuation Claims. 
 
While it is lawful to write patent continuations on the existing 
technology of rivals, the standard-setting misrepresentation cases 
add an additional element that can implicate the antitrust laws.  To 
take the simplest example, suppose that a firm has written a patent 
application that is subject to further continuations or divisional 
applications.  During this period its application is unpublished.  It then 
participates in a standard setting organization that is developing new 
technological standards.  While participating in this fashion it also 
surreptitiously writes continuation claims that are calculated to cover 
the technology that the standard setting organization is developing.  
After the participants have committed themselves to the 
standardized technology it exposes its new patents, whose priority 
dates back to the original patent, and insists on royalties from all 
participants.  Given the extent of their investment they have little 
choice but to pay. 
 
 The Rambus case involved a research company that was in 
the business of patenting designs for computer memory technology 
and licensing these to memory chip manufacturers.  In 1990 Rambus 
had filed a single patent application, which the PTO found to 
describe multiple inventions, thus permitting Rambus to file 
numerous "divisional" applications derived from the original 
application.  During the next decade the PTO granted some one 
dozen different patents based on these divisional applications.  
These applications, which ran through 1999, were given a 1990 
priority date based on the original patent application.  In an extremely 
fast moving technology market such as that for computer memory 
this created at least an opportunity that subsequent divisionals could 
have included claims for technology not reasonably contemplated in 
the 1990 application.  However, as noted previously, continuation 
applications of this sort are completely proper under patent policy 
even if the applicant writes the subsequent divisional applications 
expressly to cover inventions developed subsequent to the original 
application.  The relation back doctrine means that the patent will 
cover them.  Any antitrust violation must consist not in writing the 
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subsequent divisional applications in order to cover the technology 
developed by others, but in the misrepresentations to and 
participation in the standard-setting process. 
 
 One significant feature of computer memory chips is that they 
must be compatible with a variety of computers.  This requires that 
chip producers develop a common set of standards for performance 
and interoperability.  The Electronic Industries Association, a trade 
association including memory chip manufacturers, developed the 
Joint Electron Devices Engineering Council (JEDEC) whose 
assignment was continuously to develop and maintain 
interchangeability standards for such chips.  Rambus was a member 
of JEDEC during the early 1990s, after it had filed its original patent 
application, and when the standards for SDRAM ("synchronous 
dynamic random access memory").  During that period the members 
of JEDEC knew about original 1990s patent application, and also 
knew that one divisional patent under that application had been 
injured.  However, Rambus did not disclose that it had additional 
divisional applications in process.  According to the FTC Rambus 
also took advantage of its membership in JEDEC to formulate 
additional divisional applications written on the very technology that 
JEDEC was in the process of developing, all of which would obtain 
the original 1990 priority date under PTO continuance rules. 
 
 In 1995 members of JEDEC began to become suspicious that 
Rambus had undisclosed patent claims or was in the process of 
perfecting new ones.  Rambus refused to respond to a request to 
disclose these rights and then withdrew from JEDEC in 1996. 
 
 In a subsequent patent infringement lawsuit that Rambus 
brought against a JEDEC chip maker the Federal Circuit found the 
patents in question to be valid and infringed.  While Rambus may or 
may not have acted fraudulently, computer chip makers who applied 
the JEDEC standards would not necessarily have to infringe any of 
Rambus' patents.  The court also faulted JEDEC for failing to have 
an unambiguous standard about disclosure of pending patent 
applications: 
 
 In this case there is a staggering lack of defining details in the 
EIA/JEDEC patent policy. When direct competitors participate 
in an open standards committee, their work necessitates a 
written patent policy with clear guidance on the committee's 
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intellectual property position. A policy that does not define 
clearly what, when, how, and to whom the members must 
disclose does not provide a firm basis for the disclosure duty 
necessary for a fraud verdict. Without a clear policy, members 
form vaguely defined expectations as to what they believe the 
policy requires-whether the policy in fact so requires or not.  
JEDEC could have drafted a patent policy with a broader 
disclosure duty. It could have drafted a policy broad enough to 
capture a member's failed attempts to mine a disclosed 
specification for broader undisclosed claims. It could have. It 
simply did not.8 
 
While the decision raised no antitrust issues, the court did opine 
that a rule creating a fiduciary duty on the part of JEDEC participants 
to disclose their patent applications would raise a risk of collusion.9 
 
 A dissenter saw the fraud issue quite differently: 
 
 Rambus attended its first JEDEC meeting in December 1991 
and became a member in February 1992. At the time Rambus 
joined JEDEC, it had several pending patent applications 
derived from the [1990] patent application, which has 
spawned more than a thousand claims in dozens of 
continuation and divisional applications. Rambus also had a 
specific plan for using its pending patent applications against 
anyone using the SDRAM standard.... 
 
 Rambus did not, in fact, inform anyone at JEDEC about its 
pending patent applications by the end of 1992. Instead, 
Rambus continued to attend JEDEC meetings for three more 
                                               
     8Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102-1103 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 874 (2003). 
     9Id. at 1096 n.7, 1102.  On this point, see J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Holdup 
and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard Setting Organizations (Jan. 9, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1081997 
(suggesting that the threat of oligopsony if standard setters are permitted to insist 
on particular royalty commitments in advance could be as great or greater than the 
threat of patent holdup royalties).  See also Damien Gerardin & Anne Layne-
Farrar, The Logic and Limits of Ex Ante Competition in a Standard Setting 
Environment, 3 Competition Pol'y Int'l 79 (2007).  Contrast Mark A. Lemley & Carl 
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex.L.Rev. 1991 (2007). 
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years, watching the SDRAM standard evolve and then 
amending its patent applications to try to cover features of the 
standard. Richard Crisp, Rambus's JEDEC representative, 
testified at trial about how "Rambus was intentionally drafting 
claims to intentionally cover the JEDEC SDRAMs...." 
 
 The record is replete with additional and specific instances of 
Rambus employees attending JEDEC meetings, taking notes 
of what was discussed, identifying instances where Rambus 
already had claims covering what was discussed, and then 
seeking claims to cover what they learned at the JEDEC 
meetings. Yet Rambus "did not tell the people at JEDEC that 
what they were proposing for standardization infringed [its] 
patents."10 
 
 Deception is ordinarily a business tort that only rarely raises 
serious '2 issues.11  Because of the lack of transparency in the 
patent application process, however, deception about one's patents 
can exclude, particularly when others make irreversible technological 
commitments based on a false belief that the technology in question 
was unpatented.  The issue arises mainly in the context of multifirm 
standard setting in which a participant lies, provides incomplete 
information, or simply keeps silent about patents that it is in the 
process of perfecting.  The result can be adoption of this firm's 
technology to the exclusion of another firm whose technology would 
have been chosen had the true facts been known; or adoption of a 
firm's technology under the mistaken impression that it was in the 
public domain. 
 
 While active misrepresentations are reprehensible, silence is 
typically a problem only when there is a duty to speak.  The clearest 
case for exclusionary conduct in the standard setting process arises 
when (1) the defendant was a willing participant and the standard 
setting organization ("SSO") has a clearly communicated policy of 
requiring the disclosure of patents and patent applications as a 
condition of participation; and (2) the failure to disclose results in the 
adoption of the defendant's technology even though another 
                                               
     10318 F.3d at 1108. 
     11See 3B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶782 (3d 
ed. 2008). 
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technology would have been preferred had it been known that the 
defendant's technology was not in the public domain.  One difference 
between a government action and a private action is that the private 
firm seeking damages would have to show that a different 
technology would have been adopted or lower royalties obtained; 
otherwise there would be no competitive harm. 
 
 As the FTC characterized this conduct in its subsequent case 
against Rambus,12 while actively participating in JEDEC standard 
setting discussions, 
                                               
     12Rambus, Inc., 2006 WL 2330117, 2006-2 Trade Cas. ¶75364 (FTC, Aug. 
2, 2006), rev'd, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C.Cir. 2008) (To the extent it is relevant, HH was 
consulted by the defendant after the FTC's remedial order was entered).  See also 
Union Oil Co. of Calif. (Unocal), ___ F.T.C. ___, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. ¶15618 (FTC, 
July 6, 2004) (finding liability for misrepresentations made to a state agency in the 
process of promulgating standards; see ¶203f5; the principal arguments involved 
the Noerr immunity for communications to the government). 
 
 And see Hynix Semiconductor Inc. V. Rambus, Inc., 527 F.Supp.2d 1084 
(N.D.Cal. 2007) (refusing to strike pre-trial jury demand with respect to claim that 
Rambus engaged in a course of conduct involving abuse of patent rights in 
violation of '2; suggesting that litigation to enforce a valid patent might be part of a 
scheme that is unlawful overall; applying Federal Circuit law and concluding that 
that Circuit would apply a "causal connection" test: 
 
 before otherwise protected litigation can be a part of an "anticompetitive 
scheme" claim, the court must first find that the other aspects of the 
scheme independently produce anticompetitive harms. Once this step has 
been established, the court should ask whether the accused patent 
litigation was causally connected to these anticompetitive harms. If yes, an 
antitrust plaintiff may then include good faith patent litigation as part of the 
anticompetitive scheme. 
 
(disagreeing with Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley, & 
Christopher Leslie, IP and Antitrust §11.4f (2d ed. 2010), which would segregate 
the patent infringement action, considering it alone, and per antitrust liability only if 
the litigation is a sham. 
 
 The court then found a sufficient "scheme" in these allegations: 
 
 The Manufacturers have alleged that Rambus participated in a standards-
setting organization, understood its intellectual property disclosure policy, 
withheld information about its patent applications, waited until the industry 
was irreversibly "locked in" to the standard, and then began a litigation 
campaign to extract royalties. 
 
527 F.Supp.2d at 1098.  At this writing Rambus has won on its patent 
infringement claims in a jury trial. 
10 Hovenkamp, Patent Deception and Antitrust  
 
 Rambus refused to disclose the existence of its patents and 
applications, which deprived JEDEC members of critical 
information as they worked to evaluate potential standards.13  
Rambus took additional actions that misled members to 
believe that Rambus was not seeking patents that would 
cover implementations of the standards under consideration 
by JEDEC. Rambus also went a step further:14 through its 
participation in JEDEC, Rambus gained information about the 
pending standard, and then amended its patent applications 
to ensure that subsequently-issued patents would cover the 
ultimate standard. Through its successful strategy, Rambus 
was able to conceal its patents and patent applications until 
after the standards were adopted and the market was locked 
in. Only then did Rambus reveal its patents -- through patent 
infringement lawsuits against JEDEC members who practiced 
the standard. 
 
The result, according to the FTC, was anticompetitive exclusion 
resulting in: 
 
 increased royalties; increased prices for memory products 
compliant with JEDEC standards; decreased incentives to 
produce memory using JEDEC-compliant memory 
technology; and decreased incentives to participate in, and 
rely on, standard-setting organizations and activities. 
 
                                               
     13The FTC complaint alleged that Rambus deceived JEDEC's members by 
concealing the facts that it: 
 
 was actively working to develop, and did in fact possess, a patent and 
several pending patent applications that involved specific technologies 
proposed for and ultimately adopted in the relevant [JEDEC] standards. By 
concealing this information -- in violation of JEDEC's own operating rules 
and procedures -- and through other bad-faith, deceptive conduct.... 
     14According to the allegations Rambus created the: 
 
 "materially false and misleading impression that it possessed no relevant 
intellectual property rights" and that it had no plans to enforce any 
intellectual property rights that might later become relevant, leaving a 
materially misleading impression of its intellectual property ownership and 
plans. 
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The FTC concluded that Rambus violated '5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act by engaging in exclusionary conduct that 
violated '2 of the Sherman Act.   
 
 The Commission defined anticompetitive exclusionary 
conduct as "conduct other than competition on the merits -- or other 
than restraints reasonably 'necessary' to competition on the merits -- 
that reasonably appear[s] capable of making a significant 
contribution to creating or maintaining monopoly power."15  It 
concluded that intentional deception of a standard setting 
organization in order to acquire patents to shared technology was 
not competition on the merits.16  The opinion also noted that, given 
the FTC's broader role in consumer protection, it had developed 
"special expertise" in the recognition of deceptive conduct.17  
According to its 1983 Policy Statement: 
 
 for conduct to be found deceptive, there must have been a 
"misrepresentation, omission or practice" that was "material" 
in that it was likely to mislead "others acting reasonably under 
the circumstances" and thereby likely to affect their "conduct 
or decision[s]." Thus, in order to determine whether conduct 
(including a course of conduct) is deceptive, we must consider 
"the circumstances" in which the alleged "misrepresentation, 
omission or practice" occurred. We analyze the legal 
circumstances, factual circumstances, and nature of the 
                                               
     15___ F.T.C. ___, 2006-2 Trade Cas. ¶75364 at 105,486 quoting 3 Phillip E. 
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶651f at 83-84 (2d ed. 2002).  The 
Commission also quoted the Aspen Skiing formulation that "If a firm has been 
'attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,' it is fair to 
characterize its behavior as predatory." Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (quoting Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust 
Paradox 138 (1978). 
     16The Commission cited numerous decisions for the proposition that 
deception can, in appropriate circumstances, constitute unreasonable exclusionary 
conduct, including: Conwood Co., LP v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1148 (2003); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 
F.3d 34, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001); Caribbean 
Broad. Sys. Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1998); 
International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, 623 F.2d 1255, 1262-63, 
1270 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980). 
     17___ F.T.C. at ___, 2006-2 Trade Cas. ¶75364 at 105,486. 
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conduct itself in assessing Rambus's conduct.18 
 
 However, before simple deception as defined for purposes of 
consumer protection law could rise to a Sherman '2 violation, two 
additional elements were needed: 
 
 First, under the Policy Statement, the respondent's state of 
mind is irrelevant in determining whether the respondent 
engaged in deceptive conduct under Section 5. Under Section 
2, however, the defendant must act "willfully" in acquiring or 
maintaining monopoly power. Thus, for Rambus's allegedly 
deceptive course of conduct to be actionable under the 
Sherman Act, Rambus must have acted "willfully," as opposed 
to inadvertently or even negligently. 
 
 Second, the Policy Statement does not require proof of 
competitive harm for a respondent's conduct to be deemed 
deceptive under Section 5. However, under Section 2, in order 
to be condemned as "exclusionary," defendant's conduct must 
harm the competitive process, and that anticompetitive harm 
must outweigh the conduct's procompetitive benefits, if any. 
Thus, for Rambus's alleged deceptive course of conduct to be 
actionable under Section 2, the conduct must have an 
anticompetitive effect that outweighs any procompetitive 
benefit.19 
 
 The Commission also noted that while deception is unlikely to 
violate '2 in "competitive environments," under the right 
circumstances it can cause competitive harm.  Here, 
 
 deceptive conduct could have caused lasting competitive 
harm by obscuring crucial information, known only to one 
industry member, until it was too late to counteract the 
consequences. In this context, we cannot stress too strongly 
the importance we place on the fact that the challenged 
conduct occurred in the context of a standard-setting process 
                                               
     18Id. at 105,487, quoting Federal Trade Commission, Policy Statement on 
Deception (1983), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶13,205 at 20,911-12. 
     19Rambus, ___ F.T.C. at ___, 2006-2 Trade Cas. ¶75364 at p. 105, 487 
(footnotes omitted). 
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in which members expected each other to act cooperatively. 
We recognize that standard setting of the type sponsored by 
JEDEC potentially yields significant efficiencies -- especially 
when the standards facilitate interoperability among various 
components, to the likely benefit of industry participants as 
well as consumers.  Although standard setting displaces the 
normal process of selection through market-based 
competition -- by which, without any agreement, the 
purchasing decisions of customers determine which 
interoperable combinations of products and technologies 
ultimately will survive -- the efficiency benefits of consensus 
standard setting easily can outweigh that loss of competition. 
 
  ...  Additionally, unlike misleading statements made in 
advertising -- which can be corrected quickly by a competitor's 
counter-advertising -- there are fewer "quick fixes" available to 
correct the competitive harm caused by deception in the SSO 
["standard setting organization"] context, once a standard has 
been chosen and the industry has become locked in. If 
exclusionary conduct reduces or destroys the efficiencies to 
be gained through consensus standard setting, it may cause 
considerable harm to competition. If the anticompetitive harm 
exceeds any remaining efficiencies, standard setting is no 
longer beneficial on balance.20 
 
To this the FTC added: 
 
  We do not hold, and our decision should not be read to 
mandate, that all SSOs should require disclosure of relevant 
intellectual property. An SSO may choose not to require such 
disclosures. If, however, an SSO does require such 
disclosures, then non-disclosure -- followed by adoption of a 
standard incorporating the intellectual property, and royalty 
demands against those practicing the standard -- may be 
considered a material omission and may constitute deceptive 
conduct under Section 5. If an SSO chooses not to require 
such disclosures, SSO members still are not free to lie or to 
                                               
     20Rambus, note 12 at 105,488-105,489, ___ F.T.C. at ___ (citations 
omitted).  The Commission cited Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 
486 U.S. 492 (1988), as a decision in which the Supreme Court had been willing to 
base antitrust liability on manipulation of the standard setting process. 
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make affirmatively misleading representations. In either case, 
whether the SSO requires disclosure should be judged not 
only by the letter of its rules, but also on how the rules are 
interpreted by its members, as evidenced by their behavior as 
well as by their statements of what they understand the rules 
to be.21 
 
Speaking of anticompetitive effects, the FTC explained: 
 
 In order to assess fully the circumstances under which the 
alleged deception occurred, we also must understand the 
nature of the allegedly deceptive course of conduct, which 
combined the acquisition and exploitation of patents with a 
cooperative standard-setting process. A patent holder's 
market power may be materially enhanced once the patented 
technology is incorporated into a standard, as alternatives 
become less attractive relative to the chosen technology and 
less able to constrain its price.  For this reason, Rambus's 
alleged course of conduct, if established, could be especially 
pernicious to the competitive process. 
 
 An SSO may elect to require disclosure of patent positions 
before standardization decisions are made, because this 
enables SSO participants to make their choices with more 
complete knowledge of the consequences -- including the 
potential that those practicing the standard may be liable for 
patent infringement, unless they negotiate licenses and pay 
royalties. If the SSO members prefer a given technology, 
notwithstanding the prospect of royalties, they can vote to 
incorporate it into the standard. If, in light of likely royalty 
payments, members prefer an alternative technology, they 
can vote against inclusion of the patented technology.22 
 
                                               
     21Rambus, id. at 105,489, ___ F.T.C. at ___. 
     22Rambus, p. 105,489, ___ F.T.C. at ___.  Compare the sharply contrasting 
approach Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. v. Nokia, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 525 (E.D. 
Tex. 2006), finding the possibility of an unlawful conspiracy where the standard 
setting association knew about the technology and refused to incorporate it into its 
standard, with the result that the plaintiff was not able to charge royalties.  
Subsequently, however, that court dismissed the antitrust complaint after finding 
no conspiracy.  See 2007 WL 2688487 (E.D.Tex. Sep. 11, 2007). 
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 The Commission found evidence that JEDEC expected 
disclosure of patents and patent application by its members, that 
Rambus participated in discussions concerning the adoption of 
standards while knowing of these requirements, and that it 
nevertheless concealed its patent applications from the standard 
setting group.  It also found that Rambus' various presentations to 
the standard-setting group were not sufficient to give the group 
reasonable notice that Rambus claimed the patent rights in question 
or would assert them in the future. 
 
 On causation, the Commission also found ample evidence 
linking Rambus' conduct to JEDEC's adoption of standards 
incorporating Rambus' IP rights, and also linking that adoption to the 
creation of Rambus' monopoly power.  On the first, the Commission 
observed that alternative technologies had been available to JEDEC, 
which they could have adopted had they known about Rambus' 
claimed patent rights.23  On the second, it found strong evidence that 
ram chip technology was likely to gravitate around a single standard, 
given the strong need for interoperability with complementary 
products.24  The Commission also noted that: 
 
 Exclusionary conduct need not be the exclusive cause of the 
monopoly position. In an equitable enforcement action, it is 
sufficient that the exclusionary conduct "reasonably appear[s] 
capable of making a significant contribution to creating or 
maintaining monopoly power."25 
 
 The Commission also rejected Rambus' argument that 
JEDEC would have adopted its technologies even had full disclosure 
been made, because these technologies were superior to 
alternatives even if a royalty had to be paid for them.26 
 
 Rambus also claimed that no monopoly power was created by 
the misrepresentations because there was no "lock in" -- i.e., 
                                               
     23See Rambus, note 12 at 105,509, ___ F.T.C. at ___. 
     24See 105,509-510, ___ F.T.C. at ___. 
     25Ibid., quoting 3 Anitrust Law ¶651f (2d ed), and also discussing Microsoft, 
note 16, 253 F.3d at 79. 
     26Rambus, note 12 at 105,511, ___ F.T.C. at ___. 
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participant manufacturers were free to select alternative standards 
that did not infringe Rambus' IP rights.  The Commission observed 
that the relevant time for considering that claim was when the 
nondisclosures or misrepresentations became known and Rambus' 
patent rights revealed.  By that time, the Commission concluded, 
manufacturers had made significant sunk investments in the Rambus 
technology. 
 
 The D.C. Circuit reversed the Commission, rejecting the 
notion that "deceit merely enabling a monopolist to charge higher 
prices than it otherwise could have charged" constituted an act of 
monopolization.27  The court observed that Rambus' original 1990 
patent application included 150 claims and that thereafter Rambus 
split the application into the original and 10 divisionals, as continuing 
applications.28  It was during the period that it was developing these 
ongoing applications that Rambus worked with the JEDEC standard 
setting committee. 
 
 On appeal, Rambus challenged the FTC on two grounds: 
 
 First, it argues that the Commission erred in finding that it 
violated any JEDEC patent disclosure rules and thus that it 
breached any antitrust duty to provide information to its rivals. 
Second, it asserts that even if its nondisclosure contravened 
JEDEC's policies, the Commission found the consequences of 
such nondisclosure only in the alternative: that it prevented 
JEDEC either from adopting a non-proprietary standard, or 
from extracting a RAND29 commitment from Rambus when 
standardizing its technology. As the latter would not involve an 
antitrust violation, says Rambus, there is an insufficient basis 
for liability. 
                                               
     27Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 1795594 (D.C.Cir. April 22, 
2008). 
     28See the discussion supra. 
     29"RAND" means "reasonable and nondiscriminatory" license terms.  See 
Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and Intellectual Property, 17 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1043, 1053-54 (2002), which explores the concept and notes 
definitional problems.  Typically, the problem is not the "nondiscriminatory" 
requirement, which simply means that all licensees get the same terms, but rather 
determining how large a royalty is appropriate.  See also Janice M. Mueller, 
Patenting Industry Standards, 34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 897 (2001). 
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 The court found the second of these arguments to be 
persuasive.30  Mainly, the Commission found, in the alternative that 
absent the misrepresentations JEDEC would either have adopted a 
non-proprietary standard or else extracted a RAND commitment from 
Rambus.  However, the Commission had not determined that one of 
these or the other would have occurred.  The court "assumed[d] 
without deciding" that the first alternative would have been 
anticompetitive.31  However, the Commission itself had recognized 
that there was insufficient evidence in the record that JEDEC "would 
have standardized other technologies had it known the full scope of 
Rambus's intellectual property."32  Absent such a showing all the 
Commission had was an act of "deceptive conduct," which is 
insufficient to establish an antitrust violation: 
 
 Even if deception raises the price secured by a seller, but 
does so without harming competition, it is beyond the antitrust 
laws' reach. Cases that recognize deception as exclusionary 
hinge, therefore, on whether the conduct impaired rivals in a 
manner tending to bring about or protect a defendant's 
monopoly power.  In Microsoft, for example, we found 
Microsoft engaged in anticompetitive conduct when it tricked 
independent software developers into believing that its 
software development tools could be used to design 
crossplatform Java applications when, in fact, they produced 
Windows-specific ones. The deceit had caused "developers 
who were opting for portability over performance . . . 
unwittingly [to write] Java applications that [ran] only on 
Windows."33  The focus of our antitrust scrutiny, therefore, 
was properly placed on the resulting harms to competition 
rather than the deception itself.34 
                                               
     30Rambus, ___ F.3d at __. 
     31Id. at __. 
     32Id. at __. 
     33Citing and quoting Microsoft, note 16, 253 F.3d at 76. 
     34Rambus, ___ F.3d at ___.  The court also discussed Conwood Co. v. U.S. 
Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1148 (2003); 
and LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 153 (3d cir. 2002), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 
953 (2004). 
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In contrast, the Supreme Court's NYNEX decision made clear 
that even a fraudulent agreement leading to higher prices is not 
inevitably an antitrust violation.  The challenger must show harm "not 
to a single competitor, but to the competitive process."35  Further, 
any price increase must flow from an unlawful exercise of market 
power, not just from the deception.36  Here, "the Commission 
expressly left open the likelihood that JEDEC would have 
standardized Rambus's technologies even if Rambus had disclosed 
its intellectual property."37  It continued: 
 
 Under this hypothesis, JEDEC lost only an opportunity to 
secure a RAND commitment from Rambus. But loss of such a 
commitment is not a harm to competition from alternative 
technologies in the relevant markets. "[A]n antitrust plaintiff 
must establish that the standard-setting organization would 
not have adopted the standard in question but for the 
misrepresentation or omission."38  Indeed, had JEDEC limited 
Rambus to reasonable royalties and required it to provide 
licenses on a nondiscriminatory basis, we would expect less 
competition from alternative technologies, not more; high 
prices and constrained output tend to attract competitors, not 
to repel them.39 
                                               
     35Referring to NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998). 
     36Rambus, ___ F.3d at ___, citing NYNEX, id., and noting the rate 
regulation avoidance consumer fraud scheme that motivated the arrangement; and 
also citing 3A Antitrust Law ¶787b in the previous edition.  The court also cited, 
with this parenthetical: Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1477-78 (9th Cir. 
1997) (rejecting a claim that an insurance company's alleged kickback scheme 
caused antitrust injury to group health insurance customers where the evidence 
showed the scheme caused higher copayments and premium payments, but did 
"not explain how the scheme reduced competition in the relevant market"), aff'd on 
other grounds, 525 U.S. 299 (1999). 
     37Rambus, ___ F.3d at ___ (emphasis in original). 
     38Quoting 2 Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley, and 
Christopher Leslie, IP & Antitrust §35.5 at 35-45 (2d ed. 2010). 
     39Rambus, ___ F.3d at ___.  The court continued: 
 
  Scholars in the field have urged that if nondisclosure to an SSO 
enables a participant to obtain higher royalties than would otherwise have 
been attainable, the "overcharge can properly constitute competitive harm 
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 Thus, the court concluded, if JEDEC would have adopted 
Rambus' technology anyway, but for the deception, although 
perhaps at a lower royalty rate, then the deception did not injure 
competition.  As a result, the Commission failed to demonstrate that 
Rambus' conduct was exclusionary, as '2 required. 
 
 The court also noted the possibility that a standalone action 
under '5 of the FTC Act for deception would have had a "broader 
province" than a Sherman Act action.40  However, it expressed 
"serious concerns" about the strength of any evidence of deception 
involving violation of JEDEC's admittedly ambiguous patent 
disclosure policies.  In this case any relevant nondisclosure 
requirement would have applied to disclosure of Rambus's "work in 
progress on potential amendments to pending applications, as that 
work became pertinent."41  Indeed, it seemed clear that at the time of 
Rambus' last involvement with JEDEC it "had no pending patent 
claims that would necessarily have been infringed by a device 
compliant with that [JEDEC] standard."42  This made the case for 
deception turn on the view that Rambus had a duty, not merely to 
disclose current patents and patent applications, "but also their work 
in progress on amendments to pending applications that included 
new patent claims."43  The Commission's evidence did not show that 
                                                                                                                       
attributable to the nondisclosure," as the overcharge "will distort 
competition in the downstream market." 2 IP & Antitrust ' 35.5 at 35-47.  
The contention that price-raising deception has downstream effects is 
surely correct, but that consequence was equally surely true in NYNEX 
(though perhaps on a smaller scale) and equally obvious to the Court. The 
Commission makes the related contention that because the ability to 
profitably restrict output and set supracompetitive prices is the sine qua 
non of monopoly power, any conduct that permits a monopolist to avoid 
constraints on the exercise of that power must be anticompetitive. But 
again, as in NYNEX, an otherwise lawful monopolist's end-run around 
price constraints, even when deceptive or fraudulent, does not alone 
present a harm to competition in the monopolized market. 
     40Rambus, __ F.3d at ___. 
     41Rambus, ___ F.3d at ___. 
     42Id. at ____. 
     43Id. at ___. 
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JEDEC's disclosure requirements were so broad as to apply to 
unfiled patent amendment applications, although some witnesses 
may have believed so.  The court's own perusal of JEDEC's written 
policies could find language speaking "fairly clearly of disclosure 
obligations related to patents and pending patent applications."  
However there was apparently "nothing of unfiled work in progress 
on potential amendments to patent applications."  The court 
expressed doubt that a "few strands of trial testimony" could make 
the Commission conclude that these policies should be interpreted 
more broadly.44  Problematically, "JEDEC's patent disclosure policies 
suffered from a 'staggering lack of defining details.'"45  Beginning 
with the observation that unpublished continuing patent applications 
are trade secrets, the court observed: 
 
 One would expect that disclosure expectations ostensibly 
requiring competitors to share information that they would 
otherwise vigorously protect as trade secrets would provide  
clear guidance  and  define clearly what, when, how, and to 
whom the members must disclose.46  This need for clarity 
seems especially acute where disclosure of those trade 
secrets itself implicates antitrust concerns; JEDEC involved, 
after all, collaboration by competitors.47  In any event, the 
more vague and muddled a particular expectation of 
disclosure, the more difficult it should be for the Commission 
to ascribe competitive harm to its breach.48 
 
                                               
     44Id. at ___. 
     45Rambus, ___ F.3d at ___, quoting Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies 
AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed.Cir.2003). 
     46Citing Infineon, note 8, 318 F.3d at 1102. 
     47Citing, with these parentheticals: Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian 
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988) (stating that because SSO members have 
incentives to restrain competition, such organizations  have traditionally been 
objects of antitrust scrutiny ); Am Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U 
.S. 556, 571 (1982) (noting that SSOs are rife with opportunities for anticompetitive 
activity). 
     48Citing 2 IP & Antitrust, note 38, at '35.5 at 35-51 ("[A]lthough antitrust can 
serve as a useful check on abuses of the standard-setting process, it cannot 
substitute for a general enforcement regime for disclosure rules."). 
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Breach of Promise: the Broadcom Decision 
 
 In its Broadcom decision the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff 
stated a claim that the defendant's alleged deceptions before a 
standard-setting organization monopolized markets for cellular 
phone technology and components.49  Both parties participated in a 
standard-setting organization called ETSI (European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute) that was in part intended to 
establish increased compatibility among cellphone systems.  ETSI 
required its vendor members to commit to licensing any intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) they might hold that are adopted in a standard 
to be licensed to others on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory 
                                               
     49Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 
 See also Negotiated Data Solutions, 2008 WL 258308 (FTC, Jan. 22, 
2008).  The FTC complained that the respondent Negotiated Data Solutions LLC 
("N-Data") reneged on a promise made during the course of its participation in a 
standard setting procedure that it would license its technology at a low rate.  The 
dispute involved two acquired patents in the ethernet field.  Before the patents 
were transferred the transferor had made written promises to license the 
technology for a flat rate of $1000, and all parties to the transfer were aware of 
these prior commitments.  Then after the standard setting organization adopted the 
standard and became "locked in" to it, the firm insisted on royalties that were many 
times higher.  The respondent settled, but the decision produced a 3-2 split on the 
question of market power and also on the reach of '5 of the FTC Act.  The 
majority found an "unfair method of competition" under '5 mainly because of the 
lock-in and the fact that the deception would lead to higher prices in the product 
markets affected by the technology, citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust 
Policy; the Law of Competition and its practice 596-597 (3d ed. 2005) for 
application of '5 when "(1) the practice seems anticompetitive but is not 
technically covered by the antitrust laws, and (2) the social cost of an error seems 
to be relatively small."  The dissenters also feared private lawsuits under state or 
federal law in the wake of the FTC consent decree, but the majority made a point 
of noting that its holding was strictly under '5, which contains no private right of 
action, and not under the Sherman or Clayton Acts.  On the distinction, see 2 
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶302h (3d ed. 2007).  In 
particular, Commissioner Kovacic was concerned that, while no private federal 
antitrust action would lie, some private plaintiffs might find state law more 
hospitable.  The majority concluded: 
 
 We recognize that some may criticize the Commission for broadly (but 
appropriately) applying our unfairness authority to stop the conduct alleged 
in this Complaint.  but the cost of ignoring this particularly pernicious 
problem is too high.  using our statutory authority to its fullest extent is not 
only consistent with the Commission's obligations, but also essential to 
preserving a free and dynamic marketplace. 
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("FRAND") terms.  Broadcom alleged that ETSI adopted 
Qualcomm's proprietary technology in its standards "only after, and 
in reliance on, Qualcomm's commitment to license that technology 
on FRAND terms."50  The alleged violation was that Qualcomm 
demanded: 
 
 discriminatorily higher (i.e., non-FRAND) royalties from 
competitors and customers using chipsets not manufactured 
by Qualcomm. Qualcomm, the Complaint continued, has a 
90% share in the market for CDMA-path chipsets, and by 
withholding favorable pricing in that market, coerced cellular 
telephone manufacturers to purchase only Qualcomm-
manufactured UMTS-path chipsets.51 
 
 In finding a possible '2 violation the court observed that 
standard-setting is generally procompetitive and benefits not only the 
assemblers and users of technology but also their suppliers, 
enabling them to produce large volumes of a product with less risk 
that they are committing themselves to a technology that might not 
attain widespread acceptance.52  As the court observed, while 
standard setting might be viewed as a competitively suspicious 
arrangement that limits competition for different technologies, it in 
fact switches the focus of competition toward price.53 
 
 This is not to say, however, that acceptance, including judicial 
acceptance, of private standard setting is without limits. 
Indeed, that "private standard-setting by associations 
comprising firms with horizontal and vertical business 
relations is permitted at all under the antitrust laws [is] only on 
the understanding that it will be conducted in a nonpartisan 
manner offering procompetitive benefits," and in the presence 
of "meaningful safeguards" that "prevent the standard-setting 
process from being biased by members with economic 
interests in stifling product competition...."54 
                                               
     50Id. at 304. 
     51Id. at 304. 
     52Id. at 309, citing vols. 1 and 12 Antitrust Law ¶¶100a, 2233. 
     53501 F.3d at 309 & n.4. 
     54Id. at 309, quoting Allied Tube, note 47, 486 U.S. at 506-07, which it 
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 However, the standard setting process could be undermined 
by what the court termed "patent hold-up:" 
 
 An SDO ("standard-determining organization") may complete 
its lengthy process of evaluating technologies and adopting a 
new standard, only to discover that certain technologies 
essential to implementing the standard are patented. When 
this occurs, the patent holder is in a position to "hold up" 
industry participants from implementing the standard. Industry 
participants who have invested significant resources 
developing products and technologies that conform to the 
standard will find it prohibitively expensive to abandon their 
investment and switch to another standard. They will have 
become "locked in" to the standard. In this unique position of 
bargaining power, the patent holder may be able to extract 
supracompetitive royalties from the industry participants.55 
 
It observed that: 
 
 Private standard setting occurs in a consensus-oriented 
environment, where participants rely on structural protections, 
such as rules requiring the disclosure of IPRs, to facilitate 
competition and constrain the exercise of monopoly power. In 
such an environment, participants are less likely to be wary of 
deception and may not detect such conduct and take 
measures to counteract it until after lock-in has occurred. At 
that point, the resulting harm to competition may be very 
difficult to correct.56 
 
 The court then analyzed as follows.  Most SDOs require 
participants in the process either to disclose IPRs or to commit to 
license any IPRs incorporated into the standard on FRAND terms, or 
both.  This commitment then guides decision making within the SDO 
because it enables the members to evaluate the costs of alternative 
                                                                                                                       
described as holding that "conduct that undermines the procompetitive benefits of 
private standard setting may, at least in some circumstances, be deemed 
anticompetitive under antitrust law." 
     55501 F.3d at 310. 
     56Id. at 312. 
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technologies prior to any commitment and lock-in.57  At this time 
"[m]isrepresentations concerning the cost of implementing a given 
technology may confer an unfair advantage and bias the competitive 
process in favor of that technology's inclusion in the standard."58 
 
 The court then noted that a standard "by definition, eliminates 
alternative technologies" and can make one particular set of 
technologies much more valuable than alternative sets that are not 
adopted.59  So the reasoning on a '2 complaint was like this: first, ex 
ante, the SDO might have adopted any one of several standards, 
and in doing so would consider their cost, including the cost of any 
necessary IPR licensing.  Second, by misrepresenting its intentions 
the defendant biased this process so as to exclude alternative 
technologies that might otherwise have been selected, and in the 
process raised costs to licensees, and thus presumably also to 
consumers.60  The court then held that: 
                                               
     57Id. at 313 ("The FRAND commitment, or lack thereof, is, moreover, a key 
indicator of the cost of implementing a potential technology"). 
     58Ibid. 
     59Id. at 314.  Speaking of Broadcom, the D.C. Circuit's Rambus opinion 
stated: 
 
  There the court held that a patent holder's intentionally false 
promise to a standard setting organization that it would license its 
technology on RAND terms, "coupled with [the organization's] reliance on 
that promise when including the technology in a standard," was 
anticompetitive conduct, on the ground that it increased "the likelihood that 
patent rights will confer monopoly power on the patent holder."  To the 
extent that the ruling (which simply reversed a grant of dismissal) rested 
on the argument that deceit lured the SSO away from non-proprietary 
technology, it cannot help the Commission in view of its inability to find that 
Rambus's behavior caused JEDEC's choice; to the extent that it may have 
rested on a supposition that there is a cognizable violation of the Sherman 
Act when a lawful monopolist's deceit has the effect of raising prices 
(without an effect on competitive structure), it conflicts with NYNEX. 
 
Rambus, note 27, ___ F.3d at ___, speaking of NYNEX, note 35. 
     60See id. at 314, also observing: 
 
The patent holder's IPRs, if unconstrained, may permit it to demand 
supracompetitive royalties. It is in such circumstances that measures such 
as FRAND commitments become important safeguards against monopoly 
power. 
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 (1) in a consensus-oriented private standard-setting 
environment, (2) a patent holder's intentionally false promise 
to license essential proprietary technology on FRAND terms, 
(3) coupled with an SDO's reliance on that promise when 
including the technology in a standard, and (4) the patent 
holder's subsequent breach of that promise, is actionable 
anticompetitive conduct.61 
 
 The Third Circuit noted the defendant's argument that antitrust 
liability should not turn on a concept so vague as whether royalties 
are "reasonable," given the wide room for interpretation as to 
whether a particular royalty is reasonable.  The court might have 
added that in this case the claim was not simply that the royalty was 
"unreasonable" in the abstract, but that it was discriminatory in the 
sense that competitor and customers of the defendant were allegedly 
charged more if they used technology (chipsets) that was not 
manufactured by Qualcomm.62  That particular claim, if proven, is 
much easier to analyze than a claim whether a royalty of a certain 
percentage is reasonable.  Whatever its absolute size, a 
nondiscriminatory royalty is one that is the same to all customers 
covered by the RAND obligation.  Further, equity relief need be no 
more complex than forcing the firm to charge the same royalty to all 
consistent with its prior obligation.  Whether such relief ought to 
come under the antitrust laws is a different issue. 
 
 On the exclusionary practice analysis the court concluded that 
the complaint: 
 
 ... adequately alleged that Qualcomm obtained and 
maintained its market power willfully, and not as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident. Qualcomm excluded competition and 
refused to compete on the merits.  As discussed above, the 
                                                                                                                       
 
Citing Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and 
Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market 
Power, 73 Antitrust L.J. 1, 5, 10-11 (2005). 
     61Id. at 314. 
     62See 501 F.3d at 304. 
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alleged anticompetitive conduct was the intentional false 
promise that Qualcomm would license its WCDMA technology 
on FRAND terms, on which promise the relevant SDOs relied 
in choosing the WCDMA technology for inclusion in the UMTS 
standard, followed by Qualcomm's insistence on non-FRAND 
licensing terms.  Qualcomm's deceptive conduct induced 
relevant SDOs to incorporate a technology into the UMTS 
standard that they would not have considered absent a 
FRAND commitment.63 
 
 The court also rejected the complaint of the defendant and 
some amici that the complaint was of refusal to deal by another 
name, and that the court was simply being asked to extend the 
reasoning of unilateral refusal to deal cases.  The court noted that 
this could not be an attempt to apply refusal-to-deal law in conflict 
with the Supreme Court's Trinko decision64 to circumstances where 
the parties had no prior relationship.65 Rather, 
 
 ... Qualcomm is alleged to have actively marketed its WCDMA 
technology for inclusion in an industry-wide standard, and to 
have voluntarily agreed to license that technology on FRAND 
terms. We note, albeit in passing, that the Court in Verizon 
pointed as well to the extensive regulatory framework that 
created oversight functions and remedies that the antitrust 
laws were unsuited to augment.  No such regulatory 
framework exists here.66 
 
 The court also rejected the argument that "monopoly" is the 
inevitable result of a standard setting process because a single 
standard is chosen and this was really no more than a dispute about 
who should own that standard.  As the court noted, however, nothing 
in the complaint suggested that the participants could not have 
adopted a non-proprietary technology in which royalties or 
                                               
     63501 F.3d at 315. 
     64Referring to Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
     65On this point, see 3B Antitrust Law ¶772e (3d ed. 2008). 
     66Id. at 316-317, discussing Trinko, 540 U.S. at 404-410. 
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exclusionary power would not be owing to anyone.67  And, of course, 
prices would be lower if they had adopted the technology of a firm 
that promised a lower royalty and then adhered to its promise. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
While deception about one's IP rights or intentions in the course 
of participating in standard setting is reprehensible conduct, not 
much of it constitutes a violation of '2 of the Sherman Act.  As the 
D.C. Circuit noted in Rambus, such a violation requires some kind of 
"exclusion" and not merely higher prices such as might result from 
fraud in a transaction. 
 
 $ Rambus poses difficulties for two reasons.  First, the 
patent continuation process of which Rambus availed 
itself is fully sanctioned by the Patent Office and the 
Federal Circuit, notwithstanding that we might find 
many of its features to be anticompetitive and inimical 
to the encouragement of innovation.68  Second, in 
Rambus the standard setting organization had been 
woefully deficient in articulating its disclosure 
requirements.  In the case of clear deception in 
violation of clearly articulated disclosure requirements 
we would give the patentee the burden of showing that 
its deception was non-exclusionary -- that is, that a 
member later charged with infringement would have 
adopted the patentee's technology even if the truth had 
been known.  We would not find liability if the deception 
is not clear because the organization failed to articulate 
its disclosure requirements, as the Rambus case 
suggests.  The obligation of disclosure runs in both 
directions.  The technology that is subject of a patent 
continuation may be subject to trade secret protection 
during the time that a patent application is pending and 
unpublished,69 and the duty to disclose should only be 
inferred from a clear statement. 
                                               
     67Ibid. 
     68See Lemley and Moore article, note 1. 
     69See, e.g., Bond/Pro Corp. v. Siemens Power Generation, Inc., 463 F.3d 
702 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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  $On the other side, the conduct requirement70 for the 
monopolization offense seems clear if the defendant's 
misrepresentations induced the SSO to adopt its 
technology to the exclusion of an alternative technology 
that would have been preferable. 
 
 $ As to Broadcom,71 breach of a promise is only rarely an 
antitrust violation.  The more obvious remedy for 
breach of a promise to license at a certain rate would 
be a contract suit, or perhaps use of a doctrine such as 
equitable estoppel to prevent the defendant from 
reneging on its promises.  Nevertheless, we would 
apply '2 to a situation in which a patentee represents 
that it would charge a low royalty and later insists on a 
higher royalty, unless it is clear that the standard 
setters would have taken the patentee's technology 
even at the higher rate.  If they would not have done 
so, then the misrepresentation resulted in substitution 
away from alternative patented technology or 
technology that was in the public domain.  A sequence 
of (a) deception about one's current or contemplated 
patent rights; plus (b) the alleged infringer's adoption of 
the covered technology in reliance on this deception; 
and then (c) the patentee's announcement in 
contradiction to the statements in (a) is clearly improper 
conduct.  If accompanied by the structural components 
of the monopolization offense we would place the 
burden on the patentee to show that the other party 
would have adopted the technology even if the 
misrepresentation had not been made.  Presumably 
that burden could be met by a showing that no suitable 
alternative technology was realistically available. 
 
                                               
     70The structural requirement could be met either by a defendant who was 
already a monopolist or else by a showing that the deception did or would have 
lead to the creation of a monopoly.  The situation is analogous to monopoly 
created or perpetuated by a wrongful infringement suit.  See 3 Antitrust Law 
¶706a3. 
     71See note 49. 
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   In a situation such as Broadcom the more 
marginal case occurs when the alternative technology 
would have been in the public domain.  Suppose, for 
example, that the members would have been willing to 
pay $6 for the patentee's technology but at any higher 
price they would have preferred public domain 
technology.  The patentee misleadingly promised that 
the technology would cost $6 or less, but then later 
charged $10.  In that case the deception results in 
higher prices, presumably to customers as well, but is it 
an "exclusionary" practice. given that no firm controls 
the public domain?  Of course, a fraudulent patent 
infringement suit can do exactly the same thing.72  It 
may give the patentee a monopoly on something that 
rightfully belongs in the public domain. 
 
 
                                               
     72See 3 Antitrust Law ¶706 (3d ed. 2008). 
